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91 
THE “STEP-CHILD OF SCHOLARLY INVESTIGATION”1: 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF 
ACADEMIC JEWISH LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
David Hollander* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Why a book-length bibliography?  It is a question I was 
repeatedly asked by friends and family, and even colleagues, unable to 
understand why I would spend three years reading every law journal 
article I could find that had anything to do with Jewish law, and why I 
would write an annotation for each article, adding up to 245 pages of 
annotations.  What could such a project contribute to scholarship, and 
how would it be helpful?  After all, a few quick database searches can 
yield hundreds of law journal articles about Jewish law.  Why do we 
need a book, a print book no less, that lists and describes them?2  But 
what I set out to write was different from a mere bibliography of the 
type typically appearing at the end of a scholarly paper, article or book.  
In form, a list of works with annotations for each, would certainly be 
like those works cited lists.  However careful attention to the curation 
of the material is what I hoped would set the type of bibliography I 
wrote apart.  In addition, I intended to use my judgment as a librarian 
to choose which works to add to the bibliography, how to describe 
them, which features to identify each annotation, and how to place each 
work cited in the most illuminating context of the larger bibliography.  
In the preface to my book, I argued that this sort of old-
fashioned bibliography provides value to researchers, even in our era 
of electronic database searching.  It merits mentioning that such an old-
 
*  Librarian for Law & Legal Scholarship, librarian for Judaic Studies and Hebrew, at 
Princeton University Library. 
 1 Max May, Jewish Criminal Law and Legal Procedure, 31 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 438, 
447 (1940) (arguing that Jewish law, long a “step-child of scholarly investigation,” exerted an 
important influence on Western law, from medieval Europe through Colonial America).  
2 DAVID HOLLANDER, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN JEWISH LAW (2017). 
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fashioned bibliography is certainly not intended to replace database 
searching.  After all, I used databases to identify the articles that I 
wanted to include in the book.  However, there is great value in an 
annotated bibliography crafted by a human who reads and understands 
the nuances and subtleties of the source material, and who therefore 
can identify connections between sources, trends in the scholarship, 
and gaps in the literature.  Identifying and explaining these features 
across a broad swath of scholarship, from a bibliographic perspective, 
provides researchers with pathways to then dig into scholarly literature 
for further study, and this cannot be replicated by a database.   
What is a bibliographic perspective, and how is it different 
from the more standard substantive scholarly perspective?  A 
bibliographic perspective provides, in part, a wider perspective than 
the standard scholarly perspective, which I will call substantive 
scholarship.  But it is more than merely a “broader-then-typical” 
perspective.  In a way, a bibliographic perspective is the sort of reverse 
of the substantive scholarly perspective.  Typically, a faculty 
researcher or scholar should be familiar with the general subject of his 
or her scholarship, say constitutional law, and an expert in the specific 
area he or she is researching, say establishment clause jurisprudence.  
A bibliographer’s focus, in contrast, is in reverse.  The bibliographer 
should be an expert in the bibliographic make-up of the broad area of 
scholarship, and merely familiar with some of the details of more 
specific areas.  The bibliographer should have the time and perspective 
to recognize broader trends and citation patterns across a body of 
scholarly literature by asking questions like: who is writing what, in 
which journal, how often, over what period of time, who is citing 
whom, who is criticizing whom, how do parts of the scholarship 
overlap, and how does the scholarly material develop over time?  By 
focusing on these types of questions, the bibliographer is likely to 
document features of a body of scholarly literature that may be missed 
by the scholar digging deep into the substantive arguments of one 
subtopic.  The scholar seeks a deep understanding of the content of a 
topic covered by the scholarly literature, while the bibliographic-
scholar seeks to understand the bibliographic make-up of that scholarly 
literature.  The texture, detail, context, and nuance of the bibliographic 
make-up that the bibliographer can document and analyze are largely 
undetectable in database searching.  The bibliographer then provides 
this perspective back to the scholar and thereby plays a valuable role 
2
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in the scholarly process.  Scholarship conducted from this 
bibliographic perspective is what I call bibliographic scholarship. 
This type of bibliographic scholarship is different from 
substantive scholarship in other ways as well.  Substantive scholarship 
starts with the topic and uses substantive arguments from other sources 
in a variety of ways to make an argument about that substantive topic, 
and, in turn, to create a new source on that topic that joins the panoply 
of sources for the next scholar to explore.  Bibliographic scholarship 
takes a step back from this substantive scholarly conversation in favor 
of a larger context.  It starts with the sources that already exist, but 
instead of using the substantive arguments in those sources, 
bibliographic scholarship looks to the larger structure of those sources.  
Instead of zeroing in upon what another source argues in a close look, 
it zooms out to the 30,000-foot level to get a sense of how (or whether) 
an “ecosystem” or “tapestry” of sources fits together.  Taking this view 
provides two different types of information.  First, it can tell us 
something about the substantive arguments, but from a different 
vantage than traditional substantive scholarship, which then can be 
used by the traditional scholars to re-zoom in on arguments.  It can also 
tell us about the scholars and the scholarship from a quasi-sociological 
standpoint, a sort of meta-analysis of how the sources fit together.   
The goal of this essay is to provide a pilot study of how this re-
zooming takes place.  I intend to unspool one thread (of many) running 
through this “tapestry” of legal scholarship in Jewish law identified in 
my bibliography, and preliminarily, to analyze it.   
Part II of this essay recounts my findings from the bibliography 
Legal Scholarship in Jewish Law and describes several examples of 
early law scholarship that are defensive about Jewish law.  Part III of 
this essay provides a deeper look at these law review articles, and 
complicates my initial impression about them, questioning the 
necessity of the defensiveness found in the early Jewish law scholarly 
literature.  Finally, Part IV of this essay provides a brief example of 
how bibliography and bibliographic scholarship can provide the 
foundation for substantive scholarship by exploring potential parallels 
between early and contemporary treatments of Jewish law in the 
academic law literature. 
3
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II. PART II 
When I was writing Legal Scholarship in Jewish Law, I noticed 
something intriguing about many of the early law review articles, 
written from the late nineteenth century through about 1940.  The 
writers of these articles often seem to be responding, rather 
defensively, to something about the existing views of Jewish law in 
legal academia.  That “something” to which the authors were 
responding is not always clearly defined, but generally, the authors 
take issue with a perception of Jewish law as, undeveloped, harsh, 
rigid, or unworthy of serious study.  In some cases, the authors take 
issue with a treatment of Jewish law that is limited to the Bible, 
ignoring the vast body of Talmudic law.  Some authors seem 
uninterested in exploring why these misperceptions exist, and others 
posit varying reasons for the misperceptions, such as general ignorance 
or misunderstanding, or even anti-Jewish animus.  The clear trend that 
emerges from these early articles is that writers about Jewish law 
agreed that something about the existing scholarly literature was amiss 
and needed to be answered.  The list below will briefly describe several 
examples of these defensive articles that I discovered while I wrote the 
bibliography.  Following that, Part III will offer an introduction to how 
a close analysis of this defensiveness trend might begin.  
The Growth of Jewish Law, 1 LAW MAG. & 
REV. 569 (1872).  This article summarizes the growth 
of Jewish law from the Torah into the Mishna and 
Gemara in order to counter the view that Jewish law 
does not warrant study because it is static and never 
developed beyond Biblical text.  
Theodore Spector, Some Fundamental 
Concepts of Hebrew Criminal Jurisprudence, 15 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1924).  Spector opens 
this article with a defense of Jewish law generally, and 
then spends the main part of this article explicitly 
countering stigmatization of Talmudic criminal law as 
cruel.   
F.G. McKean, Some Humane Features of 
Pentateuchal Law, 35 DICK. L. REV. 13 (1930).  Hinting 
at his defensiveness in the article’s title, McKean 
argues against what he describes as a common 
understanding of Biblical law as cruel and harsh.  
4
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Bertram B. Benas, A Plea for an English 
History of Jewish Law, 44 JURID. REV. 39 (1932).  In 
this article, the author laments that there is little existing 
English-language scholarship on Jewish law.  
Paul L. Ross, Lawyers and Judges in Hebrew 
Jurisprudence, 67 U.S. L. REV. 19 (1933).  Before 
digging into the specific topic of this article, lawyers 
and judges, the author criticizes the existing scholarship 
for its ignorance of the Jewish oral tradition (the 
Mishna) and the large body of Talmudic law. 
Jehudah Braver, Criminal Law According to the 
Hebrew Code, 2 KAN. CITY L. REV. 104 (1934).  This 
article aims to explain the Jewish criminal code, and 
more importantly, argue that it is a humane and just 
code, both by comparing Jewish criminal law to other 
legal systems, and by exploring Jewish law’s own 
procedural hurdles to some of its seemingly harsh rules.  
G.J.W., Response to Recognition of 
Polygamous Marriages in Mosaic Law, 49 LAW Q. 
REV. 19 (1933).  This short article is a response to an 
earlier article written by a leading comparative law 
scholar, W.E. Beckett.  The author of this response 
claims that Beckett’s article’s description of Jewish law 
contains major inaccuracies.  
Max May, Jewish Criminal Law and Legal 
Procedure, 31 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 8 (1940).  This 
article aims to describe Jewish criminal law and 
procedure, but because Jewish law has been the “step-
child of scholarly investigation,” May feels it necessary 
to state that Jewish law should be seen to have intrinsic 
value as a highly developed and just legal system. 
The defensiveness present in so many of the early articles 
indicates something.  The consistency illustrates, at least, the 
perception among authors of articles about Jewish law that something 
in the existing scholarship was amiss.  Discovering such features 
across a body of scholarly literature is exactly the type of new 
information that bibliographic scholarship can yield, and the 
bibliographer’s role is to find and describe such features.  In the 
following section of this essay, I will describe this feature of Jewish 
legal scholarship in some greater detail.  
5
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III. PART III 
In this section of this essay, I dig a little deeper into several of 
the articles listed above. Here I am still engaging in bibliographic 
scholarship but taking a closer look that begins the process of zooming 
into scholarly literature in a substantive way.  By looking at these 
articles closer, what more might we learn about why these articles 
seem to start on such a defensive posture?  I will first look at one of 
the earliest examples of an article that raises the issue of the treatment 
of Jewish law by legal scholars.  Then I will examine two later articles 
that put this issue at the center of their arguments.  Finally, I will look 
at several articles that take up the specific accusation that Jewish law 
is cruel and harsh.    
One of the earliest dated articles I found provides evidence of 
several trends seen in the later ones.  In an 1872 article, an anonymous 
writer laments the neglect of the study of Jewish law in the then-new 
field of historical jurisprudence.  The author laments the common view 
that Torah law underwent no growth or development that would make 
it worthy of study.  One major theme, seen here and throughout later 
articles, is the argument against the neglect of post-Biblical Jewish 
law, mainly in the Talmud. 3  Second, the author asserts a clear reason 
for this neglect.  It is not mere ignorance, but rather anti-Jewish 
prejudice.  “[T]he neglect of [study of the law of the Torah and 
Talmud] is due only to the prejudice, which claims for the law of the 
Pentateuch that stereotyped and unchangeable character which can 
suppose no growth or development.”4  Embedded in this quote is a hint 
at yet another theme in addition to a critique of scholars’ neglect of 
Talmudic material: the understanding that Jewish law is rigid, simple, 
and unchanging.  Two of these themes, neglect of the Talmud and the 
view that Jewish law is rigid, are described repeatedly in other early 
law journal articles.  However, the accusation of anti-Jewish prejudice 
is rarely so explicitly voiced as it is here.  But what is clear is that this 
1872 article is speaking out against several perceptions about the 
prevailing treatment of Jewish law, and its critique is echoed for the 
following decades.  
This echo can be heard in the work of Bertram Benas, writing 
almost sixty years later.  And Benas names names.  To illustrate his 
 
3 The Growth of Jewish Law, 1 LAW MAG. & REV. 569, 570-71 (1872). 
4 Id. at 577.  
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claim that post-Biblical Jewish law is “largely unknown”5 in the West, 
he cites an extraordinary statement from William Markby, a leading 
late nineteenth century British legal scholar:  “[T]he Jews never seem 
to have arrived at any very clear notions about law, at least not about 
their own law.”6  Markby was a lawyer and judge, who spent much of 
his professional life in India serving on the high court of Bengal, where 
he was known to be a liberal who sympathized with the Indian 
independence movement.7  After his appointment in India, he returned 
to England where he was appointed to teach Indian law at Oxford.8  
These details of Markby’s life illustrate that his ignorance of Jewish 
law cannot be solely blamed upon a general Western chauvinism given 
that he was an expert on Indian law with long exposure to both the 
legal and general worlds beyond England.  And yet, in his writing, he 
appears to have no knowledge of the existence of Jewish law.  Benas 
points to no evidence of a personal animus toward Jews in Markby’s 
writings, but, like the anonymous author from 1872, he suggests a 
general anti-Jewish attitude among legal scholars: “When the reign of 
law in the world is to be extolled, then it is the gift of the Romans; but 
when its galling yoke is to be condemned, then it is the typical 
possession of Jewry, the burden of which Jewry has handed down to a 
law-ridden and law-laden world.”9  In sum, Benas cites Markby to 
voice his strong perception that Jewish law is neglected by legal 
scholars due to prejudice, and Markby’s prejudice from the 1870s 
remained true, according to Benas, in the 1930s. 
However, a closer look at Benas brings that critique into 
question.  In the course of making his case, Benas spends a remarkable 
amount of time discussing the exceptions, citing scholars who give 
Jewish law its due credit as an important legal system.  For example, 
Benas cites Frederick Pollack and Frederic William Maitland10 and, of 
 
5 Bertram B. Benas, A Plea for an English History of Jewish Law, 44 JURID. REV. 39, 41 
(1932). 
6 William Markby, ELEMENTS OF LAW (London, Oxford, 3d ed. 1885).  
7 T.G. Watkin, Sir William Markby, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 
(H.C.G Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., 2004).  
8 Id. 
9 Benas, supra note 5, at 41. 
10 Id. at 46; see FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 123 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1895) (“We 
may guess that if the Jews had not been expelled from England the clumsy mortgage by way 
of conditional conveyance would have given way to a simpler method of securing debts, and 
would not still be incumbering our modern law.”).  Benas notes that this reference to Jews is 
related to the unique Anglo-Jewish history related to finance rather than to Jewish law itself.  
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course, John Selden.11  He also quotes, at length, Guy Carleton Lee’s 
Historical Jurisprudence as an example of a scholar providing a fair 
reading of Jewish law, and its role in the history of jurisprudence.12  
Given these numerous exceptions, it is fair to ask whether an anti-
Jewish bias was as pervasive as Benas might claim.  
The citation to Lee is illustrative on this front.  First, Benas 
praises Lee for devoting an entire twenty-seven page chapter of his 
history of law to the “Law of Israel.”13  However, Benas expresses 
some mild disappointment that of those twenty-seven pages, the first 
twenty-five and a half deal only with Biblical law, ignoring completely 
Talmudic and rabbinic literature.14  Nevertheless, Benas is thrilled with 
the short, one and a half page section at the end of the chapter on what 
Lee terms “Later Hebrew Law.”15  Benas explains that this short 
section “astonishes the Jewish reader…with the sense of freshness that 
an oasis in a desert presents to the searching traveler.”16  Benas then 
continues to quote almost the entire page and a half from Lee.17 
In sum, Benas makes the case that an English language history 
of Jewish law is necessary in order for Jewish law to overcome its 
neglect by legal scholars and to take its rightful influential place in 
academic jurisprudence.  However, Benas cites to numerous sources 
that do not neglect Jewish law, and these might be cobbled together to 
conclude that perhaps Jewish law is not as neglected as he might think.  
Still, by citing to the inaccurate, even ignorant, claims of Markby, it is 
clear that at least some legal scholars had, at best, a blind spot when 
looking at Jewish law.  And given the number of late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century legal scholars that at least perceive a measure 
of bias against or ignorance of Jewish law, it is not possible to conclude 
that Benas is completely wrong.   
Another example of a scholar with a blind spot about Jewish 
law comes in an anonymous response to a 1932 article by a renowned 
 
Nevertheless, Benas argues that this reference to Jewry qualifies as a “brilliant flash[]” to be 
lauded. See Benas, supra note 5, at 46.  
11 See Benas, supra note 5, at 47.  
12 Guy Carleton Lee, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1900). 
13 Benas, supra note 5, at 43.  
14 Id.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 43-44.  
17 Id. at 44-45.  
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legal scholar, W.E. Beckett.18  Beckett wrote frequently in law journals 
on comparative law and related subjects,19 and indeed this very article 
was cited, somewhat ironically given its treatment of Jewish law, by 
Israel’s Supreme Court.20  In this article, Beckett makes sweeping, but 
wildly incomplete, statements about polygamy and Jewish law.  He 
states:  
Though Jews do not practise polygamy in 
England or any European country, Mosaic law permits 
it. In Near Eastern countries or in countries like 
Morocco where Jews are governed in personal status 
matters entirely by Jewish law, Jewish husbands would 
certainly have the right under the local law to take more 
than one wife and both marriages would be good 
marriages. . . . On the other hand, Jews domiciled in 
England or other European countries have no doubt lost 
by the law of their domicil the right actually to possess 
more than one wife.21 
Here, Beckett is making a correct conclusion, but for an 
incorrect reason, and reveals an ignorance about Jewish law that calls 
into question his ability to speak at all about the topic.  European Jews, 
indeed, did not practice polygamy.  However, as a close contemporary 
reader of Beckett’s article points out in a retort published in the same 
journal the following year, the reason was unrelated to modern 
comparative law, Beckett’s specialty.22  To make this case, the 
unidentified author first points out that Beckett conflates “Mosaic” 
law, which usually refers to Biblical law, and “Jewish” law, which 
 
18 W.E. Beckett, The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages Under English Law, 48 L.Q. 
REV. 341 (1932).  
19 See, e.g., W.E. Beckett, Consular Immunities, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 34 (1944); W.E. 
Beckett, International Law in England, 55 L.Q. REV. 257 (1939); W.E. Beckett, The Question 
of Classification (Qualification) in Private International Law, 15 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 46 
(1934); W.E. Beckett, Diplomatic Claims in Respect of Injuries to Companies, 17 
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 175 (1931); W.E. Beckett, The Exercise of Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Foreigners, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 44 (1925); W.E. Beckett, What is Private 
International Law, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 73 (1926); W.E. Beckett, Right to Trade and the 
Right to Sue, 39 L.Q. REV. 89 (1923).  
20 See C.A. 191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) P.D. 141 (1954), reprinted in 2 Selected 
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 327, 357 (1963) (citing W.E. Beckett, supra note 
18, for the principle that the law of a person’s domicile is used to determine the validity of that 
person’s marriage).  
21 Beckett, supra note 18, at 359-60.  
22 G.J.W., Notes [Response to Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in Mosaic Law], 49 
L.Q. REV. 19 (1933). 
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refers to the whole body of Jewish law, within which the post-Biblical 
laws of the Talmud and other rabbinical writings are essential.  Beckett 
employs those terms interchangeably in consecutive sentences in the 
quote provided above.23  The anonymous author explains that while 
Mosaic law is the foundation of Jewish law, “in the course of one 
thousand years and more a great superstructure has been erected” upon 
that foundation.24  Jewish law is that superstructure.  And while Mosaic 
law permits polygamy, for European Jews, Jewish law does not.  As 
the great superstructure of Jewish law developed, monogamy became 
more and more the Jewish norm, beginning as early as the sixth century 
B.C.E., and by the Talmudic era, polygamy was the exception.25  These 
trends were accelerated by enactment over the centuries of Jewish laws 
that imposed requirements upon husbands that would make 
maintenance of multiple wives difficult.26  Finally, in 1025 C.E., Rabbi 
Gershom ben Judah imposed an absolute ban on polygamy that was 
adopted universally in European Jewish communities.27  Beckett’s 
critic concludes that “it is not by the law of their domicil that Jews 
domiciled in the countries of Europe have lost ‘the right actually to 
possess more than one wife.’  For by Jewish law, apart from the law of 
the domicil, they have no such right.”28  What underlies this exchange 
between Beckett and his anonymous critic?  Beckett, a leading scholar 
of international and comparative law,29 appears to lack basic 
knowledge of Jewish law, and indeed even appears to be ignorant of 
the existence of post-Biblical Jewish law.  Despite this, he advances 
sweeping characterizations of Jewish law.  However, his mistakes do 
not pass unnoticed, and in twenty-first-century lingo, he is “called out” 
swiftly in the very journal where he makes his initial mistakes.  We 
can learn from this that ignorance of Jewish law among law scholars, 
even if pervasive, was quickly answered.  This attests to the 
contemporaneous presence of non-ignorant scholars of Jewish law, 
and this complicates the observation that ignorance of Jewish law was 
 
23 Id. at 19.  
24 Id. at 19-20.  
25 Id. at 20.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. (quoting Beckett, supra note 18 at 360).  
29 See supra note 19.  In addition, in the 1940s Beckett served as a legal advisor to the 
Foreign Office of the British government about the relationship between British law and the 
League of Nations. See Geoffrey Marston, The Origin of the Personality of International 
Organisations in United Kingdom Law, 40 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 403, 406-09 (1991).  
10
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uniform, or even pervasive, in the legal academy in the early twentieth 
century. 
That said, many articles of this period go beyond the critique 
that too many scholars are ignorant of Jewish law.  Rather, they 
specifically charge that scholars characterize Jewish law, inaccurately, 
as cruel and harsh, especially on the subject of criminal law.  Writing 
in 1930, F.G. McKean argues against the “prevalent…conventional 
impression” that “designate[s] Jewish law as a harsh and cruel 
system.”30  Such a view, he explains, ignores principles and precepts 
that exhibit a humanity often missing in American law, both 
historically up until 1930, when McKean is writing.31  Examples 
offered are the prohibition of cruelty to animals, the prohibition of 
torture, the prohibition of life-long slavery, and the existence of 
protections for debtors, among others.32  As per the title of his article, 
McKean only addresses Biblical law, leaving the vast corpus of 
rabbinical law out of his analysis.  Because of this, McKean excludes 
some of the ripest arguments against the harshness of Jewish law.  For 
example, he defends the Biblical law of “eye for an eye,” by arguing 
that the principle underlying the seemingly harsh rule is not truly harsh, 
namely the principle that a wrong-doer should be punished 
proportionately to his or her crime.33  While this is a strong point, an 
even stronger rebuttal to accusations of a harsh Jewish law is found in 
post-Biblical law, whereby the rabbis of the Mishna take for granted 
that “eye for an eye” should not be taken literally, but as a stand-in for 
proportionate monetary compensation for injury.34  Jehudah Braver 
makes exactly this point.35  He explains that as far back as during the 
time of Roman rule of Israel, the rabbis presumed that “eye for an eye” 
should not be understood literally, while at the same time this harsh 
punishment was “rigorously enforced by the Romans.”36  Braver also 
 




33 Id. at 14.  
34 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Kamma 83b and 84a.  
35 Jehudah Braver, Criminal Law According to the Hebrew Code, 2 Kan. City L. Rev. 104, 
105 (1934). 
36 Id. (citing EDWARD GIBBONS, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, CHAP. 
XLIV).  See also EDWARD GIBBONS,  THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, CHAP. 
XLIV, 381 (Electric Book Company, 2000) (“They [Roman statutes] approve the inhuman 
and unequal principle of retaliation; and the forfeit of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a 
11
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counters the notion that Jewish criminal law was unduly harsh by 
noting that English criminal law imposed the death penalty for over 
160 crimes until the early nineteenth century,37 millennia after Jewish 
law limited the death penalty to only a few crimes, required exacting 
evidentiary standards, and rarely, if ever, imposed it.38  And finally, 
writing in 1940, Max May also makes an additional the case for the 
humanity of Jewish law, specifically Jewish criminal law.  He argues 
that even though pre-Talmudic Biblical law may seem “unduly harsh 
or even barbaric,” it also provides countervailing humane principles 
that soften the admittedly harsh laws, such as equality before the law 
and a system of legal procedure intended to ensure fairness.39  To 
summarize, many early scholars of Jewish law in the legal academy 
appear to be answering what they perceive to be an inaccurate 
understanding of Jewish criminal as harsh and cruel.   
In this section of this essay, I took a closer look at several of 
the articles I noted in Legal Scholarship in Jewish Law as having a 
defensive posture on Jewish law.  This closer look reveals several 
trends.  First, it is true that some highly respected scholars appeared to 
be ignorant of Jewish law, for example Markby and Beckett.  Second, 
many scholars writing about Jewish law perceived a general ignorance 
of Jewish law, especially of post-Biblical law, and that some sort of 
bias against Judaism is related to this ignorance.  Third, there are many 
examples of fair and reasonable treatments of Jewish law written 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries40  This third 
point complicates the first two, calling into question the pervasiveness 
of the perceived ignorance.  Perhaps this deeper look at the examples 
reveals that the inaccurate portrayals of Jewish law are not as pervasive 
as it initially appeared, or at least that these portrayals were not fully 
representative of Jewish legal scholarship of that era.  Perhaps the 
concerns of the early Jewish law scholars were not warranted.   
 
limb for a limb, is rigorously exacted, unless the offender can redeem his pardon by a fine of 
three hundred pounds of copper.”).  
37 Id. at 105. 
38 See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Makkot 7a-8b.  
39 Max May, Jewish Criminal Law and Legal Procedure, 31 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 438, 
439 (1940). 
40 See generally supra notes 10, 11, and 12.  See also Bertram B. Benas, Renascence of 
Jewish Law, 2 J. COMP. LEGIS. AND INT’L L. 21- 28 (1920); J. Herbstein, Jewish Law, 42 S. 
AFR. L. 4-13 (1925); Isaac Herzog, Moral Rights and Duties in Jewish Law, 41 JURID. REV. 
60 (1929); Isaac Herzog, Legacies to Creditors and Satisfaction of Debt in Jewish Law, 6 
TEMP. L.Q. 87 (1931). 
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IV. PART IV 
In the previous section of this essay, I engaged in bibliographic 
scholarship.  To review, as a bibliographer I found, compiled and 
described a scholarly literature.  In this process I noted that many late-
nineteenth and early twentieth century articles addressing Jewish law 
exhibited a defensiveness about the existing scholarship, 
characterizing it as ignorant.  Upon digging deeper, it is clear that the 
literature is a bit more complex than some of these descriptions.  While 
there are some egregious examples of scholarship that is ignorant of 
Jewish law, there are many counter-examples.  In this section of this 
essay, I begin to move cautiously from bibliographic scholarship into 
substantive scholarship, mainly for the purpose of illustrating how the 
bibliographer’s work can be handed off to the substantive scholar for 
further and deeper study.  This section is intended to be a first pass at 
such an effort, illustrative of the potential for further study after a 
bibliographic scholar finishes his or her work, and the substantive 
scholar takes over.  
By the late twentieth century, law review articles addressing 
Jewish laws had become a “small but significant body of 
scholarship.”41   Responding to this development, Suzanne Last Stone 
argues that much of this scholarship misunderstands the nature of the 
Jewish legal system, and therefore, applies Jewish law to the American 
legal system in ways that simply do not make much sense.42  How 
might this contemporary critique of legal scholarship in Jewish law 
relate to the early twentieth century critiques of Jewish law scholarship 
analyzed in Part III?  Might the concerns of a hundred years ago about 
Jewish law scholarship relate to concerns about that scholarship today?  
Are there any parallels or contrasts between these two examples of 
critical scholarship?  
As discussed previously, early twentieth century scholars 
critique portrayals of Jewish law as inaccurate, and accuse these 
portrayals of ignoring the bulk of the Jewish legal corpus in the 
Talmud.43  According to these critiques, these inaccurate portrayals are 
also often unduly critical of the Jewish legal system as unchanging, or 
 
41 See Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal 
Model in Contemporary Jewish Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 (1993). 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Benas, supra note 5; G.J.W. supra note 5. 
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overly harsh.44  Moreover, many of the scholars suspect that these 
portrayals of Jewish law are motivated by an anti-Judaism animus.45  
Stone, writing about one hundred years later, is also critiquing 
inaccurate portrayals of Jewish law, but instead of finding the 
portrayals of Jewish law as overly critical or motivated by bigotry, 
Stone indicates that the inaccuracies are motivated by the opposite, a 
sort of philosemitism.  According to Stone, within this “new genre of 
Jewish-American legal scholarship,” each scholar has his or her own 
conception of the nature of Jewish law.  Some conceive it as anti-
hierarchical, and some as egalitarian.  Others conceive Jewish law as 
communitarian, analogous to feminist jurisprudence, or obligation-
based, etc.   Each writer offers his or her conception as an example 
with which to contrast, or model the American legal system.46  In other 
words, Jewish law is viewed as ripe for inspiration for whatever a 
scholar happens to be advocating.  However, Stone contends that this 
tendency results in inaccurate portrayals of Jewish law by failing to 
account for the true religious nature of the Jewish legal system.  These 
scholars are engaging in “wishful thinking” about Jewish law.47  
Because these scholars misunderstand or even disregard the religious 
nature of the Jewish legal system, their use of “the history, philosophy, 
or interpretive techniques of Jewish law to reconstruct American legal 
theory”48 leads to inaccurate conclusions.  So like the early twentieth 
century Jewish law scholars, Stone argues that the existing scholarship 
fails to describe Jewish law accurately.  But while the early twentieth 
century scholars are most concerned about portrayals that are overly 
rigid, harsh and motivated by anti-Jewish feelings, Stone worries about 
portrayals of Jewish law that are too elastic, and motivated by 
misplaced philosemitism that fails to see Jewish law clearly.  
Interestingly, in addition to echoing the early twentieth century 
critics of Jewish law scholarship, Stone also echoes one of the 
counterexamples of accurate Jewish law scholarship cited by one of 
the critics, Bertram Benas: Guy Carlton Lee’s Historical 
Jurisprudence.49  In Benas’s early twentieth century plea for better and 
more accurate legal scholarship on Jewish law, Lee is featured as a rare 
 
44 See, e.g., McKean, supra note 30. 
45 See, e.g., The Growth of Jewish Law, supra note 3. 
46 See Stone, supra note 41, at 818-19. 
47 Id. at 814, 818-19, 893-94. 
48 Id. at 818. 
49 See Benas, supra note 5.  
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exception to the neglect or mistreatment of Jewish law.50  And indeed, 
his fulsome understanding and description of the Jewish legal system 
appear to stand the test of time, and eerily predicting Stone’s critique 
of the legal academy’s use of Jewish law a century later. 
In Historical Jurisprudence, Lee offers a summary of the 
history of Jewish law; the chapter addressing Jewish law ends with a 
brief description of the often neglected corpus of Talmudic, or 
rabbinic, law, which he terms “later Hebrew Law.”51 A close look at 
Lee’s description of “later Hebrew law” astounds in its echoing of late 
twentieth century debates about the place of Jewish legal scholarship 
in the legal academy in ways that neither Benas could have imagined 
in 1932, nor Lee in 1900.  To start, rabbinic Jewish law is cogently and 
elegantly defined by Lee: 
[i]n the last centuries of the Hebrew national life 
and those immediately following the overthrow of the 
Jewish State, the Hebrew law, as it is contained in the 
Pentateuch, became the subject of an elaborate 
comment, which has been preserved in the Talmud.  
This great collection of legal treatises and expositions 
of the law covers the whole of the Pentateuch, and has 
obtained in the Jewish legal system much the same 
authority as did the Roman law in the glosses in the law 
schools of Bologna. The text upon which the comment 
was written and the treatises found has been quite 
superseded by the gloss.52  
This definition is quite sophisticated, and elegantly written, 
even if one might quibble with Lee’s failure to distinguish between the 
Mishna and the Gemara.  However, what is most interesting about 
Lee’s chapter on Jewish law is his analysis of the relation of Jewish 
law to Jewish sovereignty and the Jewish religion.  He focuses his 
analysis of the Jewish legal system and its relationship to the “Hebrew 
religion.”53  He explains that “religious fervor gave [the Jewish legal 
system] a longer hold on life than might have been the case had it 
depended merely upon its juristic excellencies.”54  The Jewish legal 
system’s connection to religion became even more important after the 
 
50 Id. at 43-44. 
51 Lee, supra note 12, at 120. 
52 Id. at 120-21.  
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destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, and the loss of Jewish 
sovereignty.  Even though “Jewish law was deprived of much of its 
authority…its religious element was brought into greater 
prominence,”55 explains Lee.  After its loss of authority, the study of 
Jewish law became even more important to the Jewish religion.56  
Indeed, argues Lee, it is the intimate connection between religion and 
law that is at the root of the survival of both Judaism and its legal 
system.57  This description of an intertwined religion and legal system 
more than faintly echoes the arguments of the contemporary legal 
scholar Suzanne Last Stone, writing almost one hundred years after 
Lee.58  And like Stone, Lee clearly describes the inseparable 
relationship between Jewish law and the Jewish religion as a key 
feature of the legal system itself.  Moreover, Lee traces influence of 
Jewish law to “Christian legislation,”59 not secular American law, as 
those criticized by Stone do.60 
It is essential to note that Stone’s critique of legal scholarship 
in Jewish law has not gone unanswered.  Samuel J. Levine, one of the 
most prolific scholars of Jewish law in the legal academy, addresses 
Stone’s challenge head-on in a 1997 article.61  Levine states that while 
he is “mindful of Stone’s observations,” he seeks to “provide a 
framework through which to consider the Jewish legal system on its 
own terms, before applying it to American legal theory.”62  While he 
does concede Stone’s point about the “fundamental differences” 
between Jewish law (a religious legal system) and American law (a 
secular legal system), Levine contends that, despite Stone’s warning, 
“certain conceptual similarities between American law and Jewish law 
allow for meaningful yet cautious comparison of the two systems.”63  
Levine then offers a lengthy explanation of the Jewish legal system 
“on its own terms,” focusing on how Jewish law is interpreted from 
within the Jewish legal system.  In an important 2010 article, Levine 
expands upon this effort, offering a “methodological assessment” of 
 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 See Stone, supra note 41. 
59 Lee, supra note 12, at 122.  
60 See Stone, supra note 41, at 814, 818-19, 893-94. 
61 Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some 
Comparison and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 441 (1997). 
62 See id. at 444. 
63 See id. 
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the development of Jewish legal scholarship in the legal academy 
generally, and proposing as a model for future scholarship of this type, 
an “effective methodology for applying a given principle from Jewish 
legal theory to American law and public policy.”64  Levine’s three-
pronged model requires analysis that: 
(1) carefully and accurately depicts the 
principle [of Jewish law], as understood within Jewish 
legal theory, in a way that is faithful to the Jewish legal 
system; (2) considers carefully the extent to which the 
principle incorporates theological underpinnings that 
are particular to the Jewish legal model, and 
accordingly, may not be suitable in the context of the 
American legal model; and (3) applies the lessons from 
the Jewish legal system only to the extent that they 
make sense within the internal logic of the American 
legal system, 
thus remaining faithful to Jewish law.65 And in the ensuing 
years, this scholarship has blossomed.  Building upon Levine’s model, 
legal scholarship in Jewish law remains, as Stone described it, small, 
but even more significant.66   
 
64 Samuel J. Levine, Applying Jewish Legal Theory in the Context of American Law and 
Legal Scholarship: A Methodological Analysis, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 933, 934, 937 (2010). 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on 
“Eye for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, An 
Introduction to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the American Legal System, 29 
SETON HALL L. REV. 916 (1999); Alan M. Sokobin, Child Abuse: A Study in Comparative 
American and Jewish Law, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 401 (2000); Note, Looking to Statutory 
Intertext: Toward the use of the Rabbinic Biblical Interpretive Stance in American Statutory 
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (2002); Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law: Duties of 
the Intellect, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386 (2003); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Ten 
Commandments and the Lesser Included Offenses of Murder and Theft, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 693 
(2003); Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, with 
Application to the American Legal System: A Psychological and Philosophical Analysis, 28 
Loy. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L REV. 257 (2006); Martin H. Pritikin, Punishment, Prisons, and the 
Bible: Does “Old Testament Justice” Justify Our Retributive Culture?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
715 (2006); Elimelech Westreich, Elements of Negotiability in Jewish Law in Medieval 
Christian Spain, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2010); Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish and 
American Bankruptcy Law: Their Similarities, Differences, and Interactions, 19 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 551 (2011); J. David Bleich, Support of Non-Biological Children in Jewish Law, 
3 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 61 (2012); Steven H. Resnicoff, Family Planning and Government 
Regulation: Jewish Law Perspectives, 15 DEPAUL J. OF HEALTH CARE L. 15 (2013); Charlotte 
Elisheva Fonrobert, Installations of Jewish Law in Public Urban Space: An American Eruv 
Controversy, 90 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 63 (2015); Gertrude N. Levine & Samuel J. Levine, 
Internet Ethics, American Law, and Jewish Law: A Comparative Overview, 21 J. of Tech. L. 
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In this section, I gave a brief example of substantive 
scholarship that can grow out of bibliographic scholarship.  The 
analysis moved beyond a bibliographic exploration of a body of 
literature, and into the substance of the author’s arguments.  I began to 
describe parallel themes found in the early twentieth century legal 
critiques of Jewish law scholarship to late twentieth and early twenty-
first century critiques of Jewish law scholarship as a means to illustrate 
how bibliographic scholarship can provide the foundation for 
substantive scholarship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Librarians play many roles in today’s academic environment, 
and unfortunately, the role of a traditional bibliographer is often 
eclipsed by the day-to-day work of ordering materials and helping 
researchers.  However, large-scale bibliographies, which I call 
bibliographic scholarship, provide a fertile seedbed for advancing 
traditional substantive scholarship.  Features and trends in a body of 
scholarship can be uncovered by the bibliographer.  In this paper I trace 
how this process unfolds.  In my bibliography Legal Scholarship in 
Jewish Law, I noted that early twentieth century articles about Jewish 
law seemed to be consistently defensive, as if they were arguing 
against several negative and prevailing notions about Jewish law.  A 
closer look at these article reveals that perhaps the defensiveness in 
these articles might be unnecessarily overheated.  Finally, I provided a 
brief introduction of the type of substantive scholarship that might 




& Pol. 37 (2006);  Avishalom Westreich, Accommodating Religious Law with a Civil Legal 
System: Lessons From The Jewish Law Experience In Financial Family Matters, 33 J.L. & 
REL. 481 (2018).  
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